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Introduction 
There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, 
thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that 
traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, 
successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, 
some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, 
claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the grip of an attractive 
but unmotivated myth.2  At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the 
arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have 
successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many 
have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will 
present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought 
does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. 
 First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and 
foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief 
to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief 
content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are 
unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for 
the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. 
 
1. Belief Content Determines De Se Belief 
 I hope to understand the notion of de se belief in a way that is neutral with respect 
to whether there is anything distinctive or philosophically special about the phenomenon of 
de se belief. Let us say that a subject has a de se belief just in case she sincerely expresses, 
or is disposed to sincerely express, her belief using a first-person pronoun. The beliefs that I 
would express with the utterance “I am hungry” or “My pants are on fire” are paradigm 
 
1 See, for example, Lewis (1979) and Chisholm (1981). 




examples of de se beliefs.3 Even the de se skeptic, one who denies that there is anything 
special, distinctive, or uniquely problematic about de se attitudes will accept the existence 
of de se beliefs so characterized; she will just go on to maintain that there is nothing 
distinctive or uniquely problematic about such beliefs. Such beliefs, the skeptic maintains, 
can be explained in terms of contents that are not different from contents that characterize 
other kinds of beliefs that we express without using a first-person pronoun.  
 The thesis I wish to argue for is the following: 
 
Content Determines De Se Belief (CDDS): Necessarily, for any subjects, S and T, if S 
and T agree with respect to the content of their beliefs, then they have the same de se 
beliefs.  
 
The motto associated with the above determination thesis is “No difference in de se belief 
without a difference in content”. “De se belief”, as it appears in CDDS, is to be understood in 
the minimal and neutral sense described in the previous paragraph. Also, I take the above 
formulation to be neutral with respect to a number of views concerning the nature of belief 
contents. First, I take it to be neutral with respect to what contents are: i.e. sets of possible 
worlds, structured propositions, or sentences in a language of thought. Also, it does not 
presuppose that there is a unique content associated with each belief. It may be that there 
are a number of contents that characterize a given de se belief. For one who takes sets of 
possible worlds to fully characterize the content of belief, the above thesis can be 
understood as claiming that there is no difference in de se belief between subjects S and T 
without a difference between the set of worlds that characterize S’s beliefs and the set of 
worlds that characterize T’s beliefs. For one who takes structured propositions to fully 
characterize the content of belief, the above thesis can be understood as claiming that there 
is no difference in de se belief without a difference in the structured propositions that each 
subject believes. 
 
3 By appealing to sincere expressions and dispositions to express sentences containing first-person pronouns, I 
don’t intend to give strict necessary and sufficient conditions for the notion of de se belief that I am 
characterizing. It is well-known that dispositional analyses of belief are subject to counterexample. Hopefully, 
the appeal to sincere expressions of, and dispositions to express, sentences containing first-person pronouns 




 CDDS makes use of the notion of same de se belief. What is it for a subject to have 
the same de se belief as another subject? What is it for them to have different de se beliefs? 
Let us say, roughly, that subject S has the same de se belief as subject T just in case S and T 
both have de se beliefs and S is disposed to express this belief using a sentence with the 
same Kaplanian character as the sentence that T is disposed to assert in expressing her 
belief. Two subjects have different de se beliefs just in case they are not disposed to utter 
sentences with the same Kaplanian character. Suppose Albert has a de se belief that he is 
disposed to express by uttering ‘I am in the basement’. For Boris to have the same de se 
belief as Albert is for Boris to have a belief that he is disposed to express by uttering ‘I am in 
the basement’. I do not intend to take any sides in helping myself the notion of ‘same de se 
belief’. Given that I have characterized the notion of de se belief in a way that ought to be 
amenable to the de se skeptic, the notion of two subjects having the same de se belief ought 
to also be amenable to the de se skeptic. The de se skeptic (as well as others) may object to 
my labelling of such beliefs as ‘the same’ given that they have different truth-conditions or 
because of intuitions regarding what is said by my utterance of ‘I am hungry’ and what is 
said by your utterance of ‘I am hungry’, but for present purposes allow me to stipulate the 
meaning of ‘same de se belief’ without any additional commitment to what makes two 
beliefs the same.  
 My argument for CDDS can be summarized as follows: (1) Suppose we have two 
subjects with different de se beliefs. (2) Then they will act differently or be disposed to act 
differently. (3) Appeal to difference in content is essential to explain the difference in action 
or disposition to act differently. (4) Therefore there is a difference in content between the 
two subjects. So difference in de se belief entails a difference in content. 
Regarding (1), I’ve explained above what it is for two subjects to have different de se 
beliefs. As I’ve defined it, all parties to the debate can grant the existence of de se beliefs, so 
construed, and grant the existence of cases where two subjects have different de se beliefs. 
Why accept statement (2): that two subjects with different de se beliefs will act differently 
or be disposed to act differently? To a large extent, this follows from what it is for the two 
subjects to have different de se beliefs. In the simplest case, one subject will utter, or be 
disposed to produce an utterance of, a sentence of the form “I am F” and the other will 
utter, or be disposed to produce an utterance of, a sentence of the form “I am not F”. 




action or difference in disposition to act. It seems plausible that producing utterances of 
different sentence-types involves performing actions of different action-types. Of course, 
there may be additional differences in action in light of the difference in de se belief. If one 
has a de se belief that he would express by saying “My pants are on fire” and the other has a 
different de se belief, one that she would express by saying “My pants are not on fire” the 
difference in their respective actions will presumably not be limited to a difference in 
speech acts.  
Statement (3) of the argument, that appeal to difference in content is essential to 
explain the difference in action or disposition to act differently, is the one that requires the 
most defense and much of the remainder of the paper will be arguing for it.  
 In order to evaluate the argument it will be helpful to focus on an example involving 
two subjects with different de se beliefs. Let us consider a case in which David’s pants catch 
fire and Susan, who is standing nearby, sees it happen. Suppose David forms a belief that he 
expresses by saying “My pants are on fire” and Susan, upon observing David and hearing his 
utterance, forms a belief that she expresses by saying “Your pants are on fire”. Also suppose 
that Susan is not disposed to produce an utterance of “My pants are on fire”. As I’ve defined 
it, David and Susan fail to have the same de se beliefs: David expresses his belief by 
producing an utterance of “My pants are on fire” but Susan is not disposed to produce this 
utterance. In the case described, it seems clear that the differences in actions between 
Susan and David will go well beyond merely producing different utterances. David will stop, 
drop, and roll, and Susan will run to get the fire extinguisher. What explains the difference in 
action? If CDDS is violated in this case, and the content of Susan’s belief is the same as the 
content of David’s belief, then there must be some other relevant difference that explains 
the difference in action between the subjects. What I will argue for in the next three 
sections of the paper is that there are no plausible candidates for the explanation of the 
difference in action other than differences in content between the agents. 
 
2. Difference in Available Action 
In order to reject statement (3), one must argue that appeal to content is not essential in 
explaining the difference in action between two subjects with different de se beliefs. 
Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever argue exactly this in chapter 3 of their 2013 book The 




and Susan and they claim that such cases fail to motivate positing a difference in content 
between the subjects. Although Cappelen and Dever don’t explicitly state their claim in 
these terms, I think this follows from claims that they do explicitly make. They argue that 
explanations of actions need not involve an indexical or first-personal element. Considering 
cases like the one involving David and Susan, they say “it is not necessary for an indexical 
element to enter into the rationalization” (p.37). They claim that an adequate explanation of 
difference in action can be given that is “entirely third-person” (p.37). As we will see, the 
third-person beliefs and desires that enter into the explanation of differences in action 
between two subjects are believed and desired by both subjects. So differences in action can 
be explained without positing differences in belief content. Cappelen and Dever agree that 
there is some relevant difference that explains the difference in action between David and 
Susan; they just deny that it is a difference at the level of content. They claim that the 
difference in action is adequately explained in terms of difference in actions that are 
available to the two subjects. On their proposed account, actions can be explained by non-
de se beliefs and desires plus facts about what actions are available to the agents. On their 
proposal, a combination of non-de se beliefs, desires and intentions give rise to a bunch of 
“inputs” and if these action inputs match one of the agent’s available actions, the agent 
performs the action. For example, if I believe that there is a beer in the fridge and I desire a 
beer, this belief-desire complex will give rise to the input action of opening the fridge and 
getting a beer. Cappelen and Dever put it as follows:  
 
According to our alternative picture, the belief-desire-obligation-intention sets 
produce a bunch of inputs…Those inputs then hit the “action center,” which is a big 
switchboard with a bunch of available actions. If an input matches an available action 
on the switchboard, an action results (p.51).  
 
So if opening the fridge and getting a beer is one of my available actions, then there will be 
the appropriate match between input and available action and I will perform the action of 
opening the fridge and getting a beer. 
In cases similar to the one involving David and Susan, Cappelen and Dever consider 
two alternative explanations of the action performed: a Personal Action Rationalization and 




and Susan, we get the following two candidate explanations for the action that David stops, 
drops and rolls: 
 
Personal Action Rationalization 
Belief: David’s pants are on fire 
Belief: I am David 
Belief: My pants are on fire 
Desire: That I put out the fire 
Belief: If I stop, drop and roll, I will put out the fire. 
Action: I stop, drop and roll. 
 
Impersonal Action Rationalization 
Belief: David’s pants are on fire. 
Desire: That David puts out the fire. 
Belief: If David stops, drops and rolls, he will put out the fire. 
Action: David stops, drops and rolls. 
 
Note that although David and Susan count as having different de se beliefs on my way of 
construing de se beliefs, the Impersonal Action Rationalization provides an explanation of 
David’s action that does not appeal to a difference in belief content between David and 
Susan. Both David and Susan, let us suppose, believe that David’s pants are on fire, both 
David and Susan desire that David puts out the fire, and both believe the conditional claim 
that if David stops, drops and rolls, he will put out the fire. And so if the Impersonal Action 
Rationalization does provide a successful explanation of David’s action, then it seems that it 
is false that differences in content are essential in order to explain the difference in action, 
since both David and Susan have the beliefs and desires appealed to in the explanation. The 
explanation in difference in action is given not by a difference at the level of content, but 
rather by a difference in available action.  
Cappelen and Dever argue that there are no good arguments to the effect that the 
Impersonal Action Rationalization is incomplete. They claim that both David and Susan have 
the beliefs and desires mentioned in the Impersonal Action Rationalization but only David 




that David stops, drops and rolls is not one of Susan’s available actions and so even though 
her belief-desire-intention complex may produce the same input as David’s in virtue of 
having the same beliefs, desires, and intentions, the fact that the action that David stops, 
drops and rolls is not one of her available actions explains why David performs the action 
and she does not.  
 But the appeal to difference in available action in order to explain difference in 
action performed is unsuccessful. This can be seen by considering a scenario in which the 
same actions are available to both subjects. Suppose that, unbeknownst to her, Susan has 
magical powers and is able to cast a spell that will result in the action that David stops, 
drops and rolls. Or perhaps, unbeknownst to her, her neurons are connected (perhaps 
wirelessly) to David’s motor cortex so that she is able to perform the action that David 
stops, drops and rolls. Having the same impersonal beliefs and desires as David, Susan’s 
belief-desire-obligation-intention set produces the same input action as David’s belief-
desire-obligation set: that David stops, drops and rolls. Furthermore, this action matches 
one of Susan’s available actions: that David stops, drops and rolls. But Susan does not 
perform this action. The action switchboard appears to have malfunctioned.4 
 Why did the action switchboard malfunction? The answer seems obvious: Susan is 
unaware of her ability to perform the action that David stop, drop and roll; she fails to know 
that the action that David stops, drops and rolls is one of her available actions. Cappelen and 
Dever explicitly deny that their model of action requires that the agent has belief or 
knowledge of one’s available actions. They write “It is not necessary that the agent believes 
or knows that [the available actions] are within actionable reach” (Cappelen and Dever, 
p.51). It is clear why they deny that such belief or knowledge is necessary for action given 
their commitment to non-indexical explanation of action: beliefs about what actions one 
has available are indexical beliefs: Susan would express it by saying “I am able to perform 
 
4 Could the defender of Cappelen and Dever’s account respond by insisting that in such a case Susan would 
perform the action that David stops, drops and rolls despite being ignorant that such an action is available to 
her? This response is implausible. What would be the explanation for why Susan performed the action despite 
what I think is a strong intuition that she would not? The explanation would presumably follow from a general 
principle governing actions such as: if (1) an agent S believes state of affairs P obtains, (2) S desires that not-P 
obtains, (3) S believes that if action A is performed, not-P will obtain,  and (4) action A is available to S, then S 
will perform A. But this principle is false and one does not need to look far to find (actual) counterexamples: 
we stand in front of a locked classroom waiting for someone to use the key to unlock it. Unbeknownst to me, I 
have the key in my pocket. So insisting that Susan would perform the available action despite her ignorance of 
its availability seems to presuppose a demonstrably false principle governing action. Thanks to an anonymous 




the action that David stops, drops and rolls” or, less naturally, “That David stops, drops and 
rolls is one of my available actions”. So the explanation of why David and Susan act 
differently cannot be given merely in terms of the fact that David and Susan have the same 
beliefs and desires plus the fact that different actions are available to them. They must also 
have beliefs about what actions are available to them and this is a difference at the level of 
belief content; a difference that I am doubtful can be characterized entirely in third-
personal terms. 5 
 I conclude that Cappelen and Dever fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
difference in action between David and Susan without appealing to differences in content. 
Mere difference in available actions between David and Susan cannot explain why they 
behave differently since even if they had the same available action, they would still behave 
differently. This suggests that the difference in their behavior is due to a difference in what 
they believe, rather than a difference in features external to content, such as what actions 
are available to them. So Cappelen and Dever fail to demonstrate the falsity of statement 
(3): that appeal to difference in content is essential to explain the difference in action or 
disposition to act differently.  
  
3. Difference in Perspective 
Unlike Cappelen and Dever, Robert Stalnaker acknowledges that there is a special problem 
associated with self-locating or de se attitudes.6 However he rejects the determination 
thesis that I am arguing for: that de se beliefs are determined by belief content; that there is 
no difference in de se beliefs without a difference in belief content. In footnote 4 of his 
“Modeling a Perspective on the World” he states, “The main point I will be arguing for is 
more controversial: the distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does not imply that 
there is a distinctive kind of self-locating content.”7 In this paper, Stalnaker considers a case 
in which Albert is in the kitchen and Boris is in the basement and there is no self-locating 
ignorance: both know where they themselves are and where the other is. Later he writes: 
 
 
5 See Ninan (2016, p.105-107) for a different response to Cappelen and Dever’s account.  Ninan’s response 
offers an equally successful strategy for defending my argument for CDDS against the challenge posed by 
Cappelen and Dever’s account. 
6 Stalnaker (2016, p.122, fn.4).  




But being self-locating…is not a feature of a proposition believed. Even in cases, such 
as the case of Boris and Albert, where there is no self-locating ignorance, and so 
Boris’s self-locating beliefs are exactly the singular propositions about himself that he 
believes, those same propositions are also believed by Albert, but they are not self-
locating for him (Stalnaker 2016, p.133). 
 
If being de se is not a feature of a proposition believed, what is it a feature of? How would 
Stalnaker explain a difference in de se belief without appealing to a difference in content? In 
Stalnaker’s case involving Albert and Boris, they have different de se beliefs, in the sense 
that I have defined, since Albert is disposed to produce an utterance of “I am in the kitchen” 
and Boris is not. However Stalnaker grants that Albert can believe the same propositions 
that Boris believes, and they can be self-locating for Boris, but they can fail to be self-
locating for Albert. Suppose that we are looking for an explanation of why Boris utters “I am 
in the basement” and Albert does not, or why Boris moves to unload the washing machine 
located in the basement and Albert moves to load the dishwasher located in the kitchen. It 
seems that the explanation cannot appeal to differences in the content of belief since, by 
supposition, there are none. So what is the relevant difference that explains the difference 
in action?  Stalnaker’s answer seems to be that the difference is in how the subjects are 
situated. In one case the set of propositions is believed by Boris in the basement at 2pm and 
in the other case the set of propositions is believed by Albert in the kitchen at 2pm. This 
difference in ‘situatedness’ of the subjects explains why believing the set is self-locating for 
one and not for the other.  
In Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Stalnaker outlines an account of de se belief 
in terms of belief states. A belief state, as Stalnaker understands it, is modelled by an 
ordered pair consisting of a base world and a belief set. A base world is a centered world 
representing the subject’s actual situation. A belief set is comprised of a set of worlds 
compatible with what the subject believes. So whereas Albert and Boris may have the same 
propositions comprising their belief set, their belief states will differ in virtue of being 
comprised of different base worlds. Boris’s belief state will contain the base world, a 
centered world represented by the individual, time, world triple, <Boris, 2pm, @> and 
Albert’s belief state will contain the base world represented by the triple <Albert, 2pm, @>. 
So I suppose that the explanation why the same propositions believed can be de se for Boris 




different de se beliefs, not because they believe different propositions, but rather because 
their belief states are composed of distinct base worlds representing their respective 
situations.8  
  I see two difficulties with this account. These difficulties can be brought out by 
considering an argument that Clas Weber (2014) gives to this account and Stalnaker’s reply 
to it. Weber argues against “the proposal to treat self-location as a feature of the believer’s 
relation to the content of the belief, rather than as a feature of the content itself” (Stalnaker 
2016, p.133, fn. 21).9 Weber claims that it is a defining theoretical role of content to reflect 
differences in cognitive significance. And the beliefs of Boris and Albert have different 
 
8 Although Stalnaker explicitly denies the thesis that content determines de se belief: Albert and Boris can be 
alike with respect to the content of their beliefs yet have different de se attitudes, it is difficult to see how to 
reconcile these claims with the details of Stalnaker’s account. In several papers, Stalnaker construes a doxastic 
accessibility relation as a relation obtaining between the (centered) base world and a set of centered words: 
“The centers of the centered-worlds in second term of the relation represent the person that person takes 
herself to be in a world that is compatible with the way she takes the world to be, and the time in that world 
that she takes it to be” (Stalnaker 2016, p.132). But this suggests that the belief set modelling Boris’s belief will 
differ from the belief set modelling Albert’s belief. After all, Boris takes himself to be in the basement and so 
the worlds in his belief set will be centered on an individual in the basement, and Albert takes himself to be in 
the kitchen and so the worlds in his belief set will be centered on an individual in the kitchen. But curiously 
Stalnaker does not take this centered representation to comprise the content of Boris’s and Albert’s respective 
beliefs. If he did, then Albert and Boris would have different belief contents merely in virtue of Albert believing 
he is in the kitchen and Boris believing he is in the basement. If these centered worlds representations are part 
of the content of belief and Boris and Albert differ with respect to what centered worlds comprise their belief 
sets, then Stalnaker’s view is straight-forwardly compatible with CDDS. But this seems to conflict with 
Stalnaker’s claim at the outset of his 2016 paper “The main point I will be arguing for is more controversial: 
that the distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does not imply that there is a distinctive kind of self-
locating content” (Stalnaker 2016, p.122, fn.4).  
I think the way of reconciling this conflict is by recognizing that the finer-grained, centered worlds 
comprising the belief set do not correspond to the content of belief. Stalnaker does not think that centered 
worlds are necessary for characterizing the content of belief once we recognize the link that such contents 
bear to the (centered) base world. In Chapter 4 of Context Stalnaker writes “it is not necessary to use more 
fine-grained contents [i.e. centered worlds] once we have added the structure to represent the links between 
a subject’s situation and the possible worlds that represent his cognitive state in that situation” (Stalnaker 
2014, p.113, my italics).  
So I take Stalnaker’s view to be that belief contents are given in terms of possible worlds, not 
centered worlds, and belief contents do not fully determine the de se beliefs of a subject. Rather whether a 
given belief is self-locating for a subject depends on the link between the subject’s situation (represented in 
terms of the base world) and “the possible worlds that represent his cognitive state in that situation”.If this 
interpretation of Stalnaker’s view is wrong and, in fact, belief content is characterized in terms of centered 
worlds and centered worlds determine whether a subject’s beliefs are self-locating, then Stalnaker’s account 
poses no threat to, and in fact vindicates, CDDS. 
9 This way of construing Stalnaker’s view is supported by a number of claims that Stalnaker makes such as 
when he writes “In general, two questions need to [be] distinguished: (1) what is the content of belief? (2) 
what is the nature of the relation between the believer and the content that constitutes its being the content 
of his or her belief? I think one should locate the essential indexical element in the answer to the second 




cognitive significance. Therefore, this difference in cognitive significance ought to be 
reflected in a difference in content. Stalnaker responds to this argument as follows: 
Weber has an argument against the proposal to treat self-location as a feature of the 
believer’s relation to the content of the belief, rather than as a feature of the content 
itself. It begins with the following thesis, with which I agree, at least on one way of 
interpreting it: “It is the defining theoretical role of content to reflect differences in 
cognitive significance. Beliefs that represent things differently should be assigned 
different contents.” (Weber 2014, 18) It is then argued that since it make a difference 
to the cognitive significance of a thought that it is self-locating, this feature must be 
built into the content. But I take the thesis that is the premise of this argument to 
concern the comparison of the cognitive significance of two beliefs of the same person 
at the same time. It implies that if O’Leary believes that O’Leary was born in California, 
but not that he himself was, then we must distinguish the content of the belief from 
the content of what he does not believe – that he himself was born in California. That 
is, the thesis implies that we should not explain the difference as a case where the 
same proposition is believed in one way, but not in another. But the thesis does not 
imply that the content of Boris’s belief that he himself is in the basement must be 
distinguished from the content of Albert’s belief that Boris is in the basement. These 
are not beliefs that have a different cognitive significance for some one believer” 
(p.133, fn.21) 
 
We can state the thesis that Stalnaker accepts in the above passage as follows: 
 
(CS1) Necessarily, if S believes b1 at time t and the cognitive significance of S believing 
b1 at t differs from the cognitive significance of S believing b2 at t, then b1 and b2 
have different contents.  
 
And we can state the thesis that he rejects in the above passage as follows:  
 
(CS2) Necessarily, if S believes b1 at time t1, T believes b2 at t2 and S’s believing b1 at 
t1 differs in cognitive significance from T’s believing b2 at t2, then b1 and b2 have 
different contents.  
 
Stalnaker’s endorsement of (CS1) and rejection of (CS2) is consistent with his idea that belief 
states, not belief contents, explain action and cognitive significance. In cases where the 
belief contents are the same, differences in action or cognitive significance can be explained 
by the fact that a different belief state is involved, where the difference in belief state 




which the antecedent of (CS1) is true, a single base world is involved and so differences in 
cognitive significance must be explained in terms of difference in belief content. In cases 
where the antecedent of (CS2) is true, it may be the case that different belief states are 
involved in virtue of differences in base worlds and so the consequent need not hold.  
The first difficulty I see with Stalnaker’s account is that it is unclear how it is able to 
distinguish between the case where Boris believes de se at 2pm that he is in the basement 
and the case in which he merely believes at 2pm that Boris is in the basement without 
having the corresponding de se belief. As we’ve seen, de se belief on Stalnaker’s account 
involves appeal to two ingredients: a base world and a belief content. But we can consider a 
case in which Boris at 2pm believes that he himself is in the basement and a case in which 
Boris at 2pm believes that Boris is in the basement without believing de se that he is in the 
basement. In both cases the subject is the same and the time of believing is the same. So 
these features (namely the base world) cannot be appealed to in order to explain the 
difference in cognitive significance. The only option seems to be to explain the difference in 
terms of a difference in belief content. But, as we’ve seen, Stalnaker claims that “the 
distinctive character of self-locating attitudes does not imply that there is a distinctive kind 
of self-locating content” (Stalnaker 2016, p.112, fn. 4). When it comes to the difference 
between Boris’s belief at 2pm that he himself is in the basement and Boris’s third-person 
belief at 2pm that Boris is in the basement, the distinctive character of self-locating 
attitudes does imply that there is a distinctive kind of self-locating content. If the difference 
is captured at the level of content in such a case, then the question arises why this 
difference in content doesn’t also explain the difference between Boris’s belief that he 
himself is in the basement and Albert’s belief that Boris is in the basement. This leads to the 
second difficulty.  
The second difficulty arises when we consider Boris’s de se belief that he himself is in 
the basement and Albert’s non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement. Let us suppose 
that at 2pm 
 
1. Boris believes that he himself is in the basement. 
 
Let us call the content of Boris’s de se belief ‘C1’. Stalnaker maintains that Albert can believe 




the above-quoted passage Stalnaker rejects Weber’s argument for the claim that “the 
content of Boris’s belief that he himself is in the basement must be distinguished from the 
content of Albert’s belief that Boris is in the basement” (p.133, fn.21). This supports the 
following two premises: 
 
2. Albert believes C1 and believes that Boris is in the basement. 
 
3. Albert believes C1 and does not believe that he himself is in the basement.  
 
Given that the case described does not involve any confusion over who is who and no one is 
ignorant of anyone’s location, the following premise is also true. 
 
4. Boris also believes that Boris is in the basement.  
 
Let us call the content of this belief of Boris’s ‘C2’. 
Since Boris’s belief at 2pm that he himself is in the basement differs in cognitive significance 
from Boris’s belief that Boris is in the basement (Boris could believe that Boris is in the 
basement without believing that he is Boris and that he is in the basement and, so, fail to 
unload the washing machine), it follows from (CS1), the principle that Stalnaker endorses, 
that: 
 
5. The content of C1 differs from the content of C2. 
 
But we’ve already noted that the content of Albert’s belief that Boris is in the basement is 
the same as the content of Boris’s belief that he himself is in the basement, namely C1. So: 
 
6. Therefore, the content of Boris’s belief that Boris is in the basement is not the 
same as the content of Albert’s belief that Boris is in the basement.  
 
What Boris believes when Boris believes that Boris is in the basement is not the same as 
what Albert believes when he believes that Boris is in the basement. This conclusion strikes 




that it allows for a simple, straight-forward account of what it is for two subjects to have the 
same belief, yet his view seems to commit him to maintaining that Boris and Albert believe 
different things when they believe that Boris is in the basement. Alternatively, if we grant 
that the content of Boris’s belief that Boris is in the basement is the same as the content of 
Albert’s belief that Boris is in the basement, then we must deny that the content of Albert’s 
belief that Boris is in the basement is the same as the content of Boris’s belief that he 
himself is in the basement.  
Stalnaker’s acceptance of CS1 and rejection of CS2 strikes me as an unstable and 
unattractive position. First, it seems to grant that when it comes to beliefs of the same 
person at the same time, de se belief is a matter of the content believed. What then 
motivates denying this dependence of de se belief on content when it comes to different 
subjects or different times? Furthermore, Stalnaker’s acceptance of CS1 and rejection of CS2 
seem at odds with the very motivations that lead him to claim that Boris’s de se belief that 
he himself is the basement has the same content as Albert’s non-de se belief that Boris is in 
the basement. Stalnaker’s motivation for locating the de se-ness in the relation rather than 
the content is to allow for “agreement and disagreement between believers, and the 
communication of belief” (Stalnaker 1999, p.20). But this motivation seems to be 
undermined when we consider Boris’s non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement and 
Albert’s non-de se belief that Boris is in the basement. I don’t see how these beliefs can 
have the same content given that Stalnaker accepts CS1 and claims that Albert’s non-de se 
belief has the same content as Boris’s de se belief. I conclude that Stalnaker’s attempt at 
denying that de se belief is determined by the content of belief is unsuccessful.10  
 
4. Perry, Belief States, and Content 
Another sort of account that seems to deny CDDS is John Perry’s account of de se belief. 
What I will argue in this section is that the sense in which Perry’s view appears to reject 
CDDS is merely terminological and, in the way in which I think the notion of content ought 
to be understood, Perry’s account is in fact in accordance with the thesis.  
 
10 Given that the second difficulty I raise for Stalnaker’s account arises from accepting CS1 and rejecting CS2, 
would the account avoid difficulty by adopting a uniform approach to the relation between cognitive 
significance and belief content by accepting both CS1 and CS2? Such an account grants the central premise of 
Weber’s argument for the conclusion that what makes a belief self-locating is a feature of its content, and 
would end up vindicating CDDS rather than providing an alternative to it. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 




The view that Perry defends in his landmark 1979 paper “The Problem of the 
Essential Indexical” involves distinguishing between the content of a belief and the belief 
state in which the content is believed.11 Considering the pants-on-fire example above, 
suppose that David first sees a reflection of himself in the mirror without realizing that it is 
him and comes to believe of the man in the mirror that his pants are on fire without 
believing that his own pants are on fire. When David later realizes that his own pants are on 
fire, Perry maintains that the content of his belief is the same as the content of his belief 
when he believes of the man in the mirror that his pants are on fire: in both cases it is the 
singular proposition that David’s pants are on fire. However Perry claims that the content is 
accessed in a different way in each case. Perry notes that, when David realizes that his own 
pants are on fire, he has something in common with anyone who has found themselves in a 
similar predicament and would be inclined to say “My pants are on fire!”. He denies that 
what these individuals have in common is the same singular propositional content: if, for 
example, Susan were to find that her pants are on fire, she would believe a different 
singular proposition, namely the proposition that Susan’s pants are on fire. But nonetheless 
Susan would be in the same belief state as David despite believing a different content.  
 Exactly how belief states are to be understood is a matter of some debate, and 
Perry’s own understanding of this notion has evolved over time. Nonetheless, the basic idea 
seems clear enough: all those who are disposed to utter “My pants are on fire!” are in one 
belief state and all those who are disposed to utter “Your pants are on fire!” are in another 
belief state, even though, among those classified together by belief state, different singular 
propositions serve as the content of belief. 
 If we interpret Perry’s account by the letter, it seems to reject CDDS. In our original 
case, David and Susan have the same relevant belief contents, but they have different de se 
beliefs. David and Susan both have as the content of their belief the singular proposition 
that David’s pants are on fire, but David accesses the proposition through the belief state 
that is classified by the sentence-type “My pants are on fire” and Susan accesses the 
proposition through the belief state that is classified by the sentence-type “Your pants are 
on fire”. So it seems that CDDS is violated since David and Susan can have different de se 
 
11 It is worth noting that Perry’s notion of a belief state differs fundamentally from Stalnaker’s notion of a 




beliefs while believing the same content so long as they access the content in different 
ways. 
 However I think it would be a mistake to take Perry’s account as at odds with CDDS, 
at least as I intended it. Perry’s belief states ought to be understood as having content and 
so David and Susan differ with respect to their belief contents in virtue of being in different 
belief states. At the very least, belief states ought to be understood as having content in the 
sense that I am interested in when formulating the determination thesis. The fact that Perry 
reserves the term ‘content’ for the singular proposition believed by the subject is a mere 
choice in terminology, and belief states ought to be understood as having content because 
they play the same theoretical roles that contentful states play in other theories. Below I 
provide three reasons why I think it is correct to maintain that belief states have content. 
 First, belief states can be classified by abstract objects in the way that content is 
classified on other accounts. Perry claims that belief states can be classified according to 
sentence-types containing indexicals, however one could also classify belief states according 
to properties, functions, or sets of centered worlds.12 The belief state that David is in when 
he comes to believe that his own pants are on fire may be taken to be the property of 
wearing pants that are on fire, or a function from individuals to truth-values (returning true 
for all and only those individuals whose pants are on fire), or a set of worlds centered on all 
and only those whose pants are on fire. The fact that there is a natural way of assigning 
abstract objects to belief states, as in other accounts of belief content, suggests that belief 
states have content. 
 A second reason why belief states have content is because they account for 
similarities and differences in belief between different subjects in the way that other 
accounts of content do.13 If I believe that I am the tallest person in the room and you believe 
that you are the tallest person in the room, there is a straightforward sense in which we 
believe something similar: there is a sense in which what I believe is the same as what you 
believe. This similarity in belief is captured, not by the distinct singular proposition that each 
of us believes, but rather by the fact that we are both in the same belief state. Similarly, 
there is a straightforward sense in which David and Susan believe different things when 
 
12 Lewis (1979) interprets Perry’s view as claiming that belief has two contents: a singular proposition and a 
function from individuals to singular propositions. See Lewis (1979, p.536-537). So Lewis interprets Perry’s 
belief states as having content. 




David stops, drops, and rolls, and Susan runs to get a fire extinguisher. This difference is 
captured, not by the same singular proposition that they both believe, but by the fact that 
they are in different belief states. It is the role of content to explain what is the same or 
what is different about two subjects’ beliefs and, in these cases, that role is satisfied by the 
belief states of the subject. 
 Thirdly, belief states have content because, like other accounts of content, they are 
representational. One way to see this is by recognizing that some belief states are better at 
representing a subject’s predicament than others. If David’s pants are on fire, then if David 
accesses the singular proposition that David’s pants are on fire through the belief state that 
is classified by the sentence-type “My pants are on fire” he does a better job representing 
his actual predicament than if he accesses the same singular proposition through the belief 
state classified by the sentence type “Your pants are on fire”. These better and worse ways 
in which David can represent his actual predicament are not captured by the singular 
proposition he believes, which is true in both cases. Perhaps it is questionable whether 
belief states can be properly described as being true or false. However, there is a clear sense 
in which they represent a subject’s predicament and some belief states do a better job at 
this than others. This suggests that belief states are themselves representational and so 
satisfy another functional role of belief content. 
 Perry’s belief states play all the same theoretical roles that content plays on other 
accounts, and so, I think it is appropriate to conclude that they have content. Given that 
Perry’s belief states have content, I do not think that Perry’s account, properly understood, 
is committed to denying (CDDS). It is true that David and Susan have different content in 
virtue of being in different belief states with respect to their belief that David’s pants are on 
fire.  
 
5. In Defense of De Se Content. 
I have argued for the claim that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in 
content. I have also argued that various attempts at rejecting this argument are 
unsuccessful. Now I wish to argue that there is a special kind of content that explains 
difference in action and deserves the name ‘de se content’.  
 Following Max Kölbel (2013), let us introduce the notion of a globally portable 




locations as points of evaluation within a world. For our purposes, it doesn’t matter whether 
locations are understood as individuals, places, individual/time pairs, or spacetime points. P 
is a globally portable proposition only if for all locations, l1 and l2, within a world, p is true at 
I1 if and only if p is true at l2. The account of a globally portable proposition is intended to 
be neutral with respect to various accounts of what propositions are: so long as the 
proposition doesn’t vary in truth-value within a world, whether it is a singular proposition, a 
sentence in the language of thought, or a set of possible worlds, it is a globally portable 
proposition. Also, I am assuming that propositions are true or false at locations. It might 
sound awkward to claim that the proposition that bananas contain potassium is true at 
Tokyo or at Taylor Swift but, it seems nonetheless correct. If the proposition that bananas 
contain potassium is true, it is true everywhere in the actual world. 
 In addition to having global truth-values (i.e. being true (or false) at all points of 
evaluation within a world), I will also assume that globally portable propositions are 
sharable. If a subject, s1, in w believes globally portable proposition, p, then it is possible in 
the relevant sense, for any subject, s2, in w to also believe p. It is possible in the relevant 
sense for another person to believe p if they are capable of believing it assuming they have 
the necessary concepts, the requisite mental abilities, and perhaps necessary experiences.14 
To claim that a proposition is sharable is to deny that accessibility to the proposition is 
limited in the sense described by Perry (1979, p.15-16). The globally portable proposition 
that bananas contain potassium is sharable in that, not only do I believe it, but anyone else 
can also believe it (assuming they have the necessary concepts, mental abilities, and so 
forth).  
 My argument for de se content is as follows: Let us suppose that David and Susan 
agree with respect to the relevant globally portable propositions that they believe. Both 
believe, for example, that David’s pants are on fire, that Susan’s pants are not on fire, that 
David is not identical to Susan, that David and Susan are in the same room. It seems 
plausible to take these propositions to be globally portable: if it is true that David’s pants are 
 
14 If an experience or concept is necessary for believing a globally portable proposition, the experience or 
concept itself must be public in the sense that others can experience it or have the concept. If the experience 





on fire, then it is true everywhere (within our world) that David’s pants are on fire.15  
Suppose also that despite believing all the same relevant globally portable propositions, 
David and Susan have different de se beliefs, in the sense that I’ve outlined above. Applying 
CDDS, we reach the conclusion that David and Susan have a difference in belief content. 
Some of the relevant belief content that differs between David and Susan is not globally 
portable propositional content since we’ve supposed that Susan and David agree with 
respect to the relevant globally portable propositions that they believe. Call the relevant 
content that is not globally portable and differs between David and Susan ‘de se content’.  
One controversial premise in this argument is the claim that David and Susan can 
have different de se beliefs, yet believe the same globally portable propositions. This 
premise may seem to beg the question against the opponent of uniquely de se content. It’s 
important, firstly, to recognize that the premise is only that they have different de se beliefs 
in the weak sense outlined at the beginning of the paper: David produces or is disposed to 
produce an utterance of “My pants are on fire!” and Susan does not produce nor is disposed 
to produce this utterance. Secondly, I take this premise to be motivated by the following 
considerations. Suppose that David and Susan have different de se beliefs in this weak 
sense. Given this, why can’t it be the case that for every relevant globally portable 
proposition David believes, Susan also believes it, and for every relevant globally portable 
proposition Susan believes, David also believes it?  I fail to see how agreement with respect 
to globally portable propositions that Susan and David believe would be incompatible with 
their respective de se beliefs. If having different de se beliefs requires believing different 
globally portable propositions, what is the candidate globally portable proposition?  What 
difference in globally portable propositions believed would lead David to produce an 
utterance of “My pants are on fire!” and would lead Susan to produce an utterance of “Your 
pants are on fire!”? 
A more rigorous defense of the premise that David and Susan can believe all the 
same globally portable propositions, yet have different de se beliefs can be given as follows: 
Suppose that, contrary to the claim I am defending, having different de se beliefs is due to 
believing different globally portable propositions. Then the difference in de se belief 
 
15 Here and in what follows I put aside issues having to do with time and temporal propositions. If what David 
and Susan believe is a temporal proposition that is true at some times and false at other times, then it is not 




between David and Susan is due to the fact that one of them believes at least one globally 
portable proposition that the other one fails to believe. In the case where David’s pants are 
on fire and David has the de se belief that he would express by saying “My pants are on 
fire!”, it seems plausible to assume that if David’s de se belief is held in virtue of David 
believing a globally portable proposition, then that globally portable proposition is true; 
after all, David’s de se belief is true: when he utters “My pants are on fire!” he says 
something true. Let us suppose that difference in de se belief between David and Susan is 
fully explained by the fact that David believes a true globally portable proposition that Susan 
fails to believe.16 Call this candidate globally portable proposition ‘P’. Given that globally 
portable propositions are sharable, it is possible for Susan to also believe P and, and given 
that globally portable propositions, by definition, have the same truth value at all points of 
evaluation within a world, and Susan and David inhabit the same world, Susan’s belief that P 
would be true. But then David and Susan would believe the same globally portable 
propositions and so, given that the objector is denying the possibility of believing the same 
globally portable propositions and having different de se beliefs, David and Susan would 
have the same de se beliefs. Given how we have construed sameness of de se belief, this 
means that Susan would have the de se belief that she would express by saying “My pants 
are on fire!”. But this belief would be false since her pants are not on fire. So given that 
globally portable propositions are sharable and do not vary in truth-value within a world, 
they cannot account for the difference in de se belief between David and Susan. 
Once we grant that David and Susan have different de se beliefs, we can apply CDDS 
to conclude that David and Susan have a difference in belief content. The conclusion that 
they have a difference in belief content, by itself, is perhaps unsurprising. But we are 
entitled to a stronger conclusion: that there is difference in content relevant to David and 
Susan’s predicament that is not globally portable, content that figures into an explanation of 
the difference in de se belief and behavior between David and Susan. Why are we entitled 
to this stronger conclusion? We’ve assumed that David and Susan agree with respect to the 
relevant globally portable propositions that they believe so the difference in content cannot 
 
16 The assumption that there is a unique globally portable proposition that accounts for the difference in de se 
belief between David and Susan is perhaps a simplifying assumption but the argument can be extended to 
cases where the difference is accounted for by more than one globally portable proposition. Alternatively, one 
could take P to be the conjunction of all the globally portable propositions that account for the difference in de 




be due to such propositions. This means that the difference in content between David and 
Susan is either a difference in irrelevant globally portable propositions or relevant 
propositions that are not globally portable (propositions that are either not sharable or lack 
a global truth-value). So long as we insist that there must be an explanation of the 
difference in de se belief and behavior between David and Susan, the difference in content 
must be due to relevant propositions that are not globally portable. No irrelevant globally 
portable proposition, such as that David believes that bananas contain potassium and Susan 
does not, will explain why David produces an utterance of “My pants are on fire” and Susan 
does not, or why David stops, drops and rolls, and Susan runs to get the fire extinguisher. So 
there is content relevant to David and Susan’s current predicament that is not globally 
portable, content that figures into an explanation of the difference in de se belief and 
behavior between David and Susan. Call this relevant content that differs between David 
and Susan ‘de se content’.  
Note that I haven’t argued for a particular kind of de se content, only that such 
content exists. The result is compatible with a number of different accounts of what 
constitutes de se content. The argument however denies that such content is given by 
globally portable propositions. There are two ways in which one might deny that such 
content is globally portable: either by denying its portability or by denying its globality (that 
it has global truth-values).17 Adopting the former way involves positing limited accessibility 
as Gottlob Frege famously did. According to Frege, David’s de se belief that his pants are on 
fire involves David being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he 
is presented to no-one else” (Frege 1918, p.132). A view that claims that David believes a 
demonstrative proposition that only he has access to, such as the thinker of this very 
thought has pants that are on fire, would likewise deny that the relevant content is 
portable.18 On one way of filling in the details, Perry’s (1979) account also involves denying 
portability. If we take belief content to consist of ordered pairs of singular propositions and 
 
17 This point has been made numerous times in the de se literature in various ways. In his 2016, Dilip Ninan 
provides a particularly careful and rigorous characterization of the "problem of de se attitudes" and argues 
that accepting a plausible principle of action explanation leads to an incompatibility between the thesis that 
contents of attitudes have global truth-values and "the thesis all contents are public or shareable". He goes on 
to note that "Thus, it is not surprising that we should find in the literature a view like Lewis’s, which denies 
ABSOLUTENESS, or a view like Frege’s, which denies the shareability of de se contents" (Ninan 2016, p.110). 





belief states classified by sentences containing indexicals, then de se content is not portable. 
David’s belief that his pants are on fire involves David having the belief content <David’s 
pants are on fire, “My pants are on fire”> and no one else is able to believe this content.19 
Adopting the latter way, denying globality, involves positing content that differs in 
truth-value from one individual to the next. One way of doing this is to take de se content to 
be properties rather than traditional propositions as proposed by Lewis (1979) and Chisholm 
(1981).20 For David to believe that his pants are on fire is for David to believe (or self-
ascribe) the property wearing pants that are on fire. This is a property that is had by David 
but not by Susan. We can take properties to be true at individuals just in case the individual 
has the property ascribed. Susan’s belief involves believing a different property such as the 
property of being perceptually acquainted with someone whose pants are on fire. A 
centered worlds approach to de se thought similarly denies that de se content has global 
truth-values.21 If the content of David’s de se belief is the set of worlds centered on an 
individual whose pants are on fire, this content is true at those individuals who have flaming 
pants and false at those who don’t. So, centered worlds content is not true at all locations 





19 A question arises as to the modal status of non-portability in these accounts. I intend non-portability to be 
understood in terms of metaphysical possibility: if proposition p serves as the content of S’s belief and p is not 
portable, then it is metaphysically impossible for someone distinct from S to have p as the content of her 
belief. I take this to be a plausible interpretation of Frege’s claim: when David believes that his pants are on 
fire, it is not merely that he is presented to himself in a way in which no one else actually is (as may be the case 
when he looks in the mirror when no one else is around), but rather he cannot be presented to anyone else in 
the way in which he is presented to himself. Similarly, the version of Perry’s account I have in mind here claims 
that it is metaphysically impossible for someone distinct from David to have the belief content <David’s pants 
are on fire, “My pants are on fire”>.  If, for example, a token-reflexive theorist maintains that it is possible for 
someone other than David to have the belief content the thinker of this very thought has pants that are on fire, 
then such an account would not posit non-portability. Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this 
issue. 
20 Recent versions of the property account of de se content have been defended by Feit (2010) and Recanati 
(2012). 
21 The centered worlds approach can be traced back to Quine (1969). It has been defended as an account of de 
se content by many including Egan (2006), Elga (2000), Moss (2012) and Ninan (2010). Lewis takes the 
centered worlds approach to be equivalent to the properties approach he defends (See Lewis 1979, 531-532); 
thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. However depending on what one takes properties to be 




In this paper I have characterized an account of de se belief that is intended to be neutral 
with respect to the view that there is a special kind of de se content. I then argued in favor 
of a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content. According to the 
determination thesis, there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief 
content. I argued that various proposals that reject this determination thesis face 
insurmountable difficulties. In the last section I use the determination thesis to argue for a 
type of content that is deserving of the name ‘de se content’. I also show how de se content 
may differ in kind from non-de se content: in virtue of either being non-portable or in virtue 
of not having global truth-values. I take these considerations to vindicate the view that 
there is indeed a special kind of content that is not globally portable and is essential to 
explaining differences in action.22  
 
 
22 Thanks to Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Dirk Kindermann, an anonymous referee for this journal, and the 
audience of the 3rd Workshop on Semantic Content and Conversational Dynamics at the University of 
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